Over the past two decades, imposition of sanctions on Iran has evolved into a dynamic game between Tehran and the international community, with every new round provoking a series of Iranian counter-measures. One of Tehran's weapons in this tussle has been to use its trade policy as a way of discouraging some countries from co-operating with sanctions or aligning themselves too closely with the anti-Iran camp.
A highly visible example has been Iran's trade relations with the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. Iran has deliberately expanded its trade and investment ties so as to increase the economic costs for them of joining western-sponsored sanctions initiatives. Since 2000, for instance, GCC exports to Iran have increased dramatically, reaching $13.4bn in 2008-09, and thus the GCC states, particularly the UAE, have enjoyed a sizeable trade surplus with respect to Iran.
Simultaneously, Tehran has used trade to discourage the GCC states from forming a united anti-Iranian front headed by Saudi Arabia. This is why it has called for the joint development of its shared gas fields with Kuwait and Qatar but not the Saudis, preferred to trade in UAE dirhams but not other GCC currencies, insisted on regional security arrangements, championed the cause of Shia Muslims in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, maintained friendly relations with Oman where the vast majority of the population resent the Wahhabi/Saudi version of Islam, and given the Qatar Airways the right to operate its domestic flights.
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